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CONCLUDING REMARKS
There does not seem to be very much in common
between the relevant rules of French and German law
except, to some extent insofar as they concern the calling
of meetings, and derivative actions. Thus German law does
not contain any provisions permitting a minority to object
to the appointment of auditors, or to request the court to
deprive shareholders who have been guilty of non-
disclosure of their holdings, of their voting rights. Despite
the provisions of paragraphs 131 and 132 AktG, German
shareholders in public companies do not appear to enjoy
the extensive rights to information and documents enjoyed
by their French counterparts. Shareholders in French
public companies which are listed have still more extensive
rights.
If the draft Fifth Directive on Employee Participation
and Company Structure had been enacted, this would have
resulted in the establishment of common rules for
derivative actions in the EC Member States (see Articles 14
and 16 of the 1972 proposal). Such a development now
seems unlikely, as owing to political opposition, work on
the draft Fifth Directive has now been abandoned. This
development should not deter the enactment of substantive
rules governing the derivative action in states in which such
rules do not exist. Such rules should, it is submitted be
applicable to certain situations where directors have been




Although the doctrine of uti possidetis finds its originsin the jus civile of Roman law, it was transposed intointernational law to facilitate the creation of new
states during the decolonisation of Latin America and
subsequently Africa. In its modern form the doctrine
provides ‘that new States will come to independence with
the same boundaries they had when they were
administrative units within the territory or territories of a
colonial power’ (Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The
Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, 67 BYIL, 1996, 76,
97). For present purposes, the utility of uti possidetis lies in
the fact that it provides an excellent illustration of the
tension existing within modern international law between
the evolution of the right to self-determination and the
entitlement of states to protect their territorial integrity
and retain exclusive jurisdiction in domestic matters.
By way of introduction, the article will briefly discuss the
right to self-determination and the problems it poses for
the international state system. Against the backdrop of
African decolonisation it will then examine the
ramifications of uti possidetis for self-determination in an
attempt to decipher the key priorities of the current
international system. Finally, the article will seek to assess
the validity of the recent extension of uti possidetis to non-
colonial situations and the resonance of this development
for modern international law in general.
1. Self-determination and existing territorial
regimes
One theory of self-determination considers the state to
be merely the political manifestation of its constituent
nation (or people). This interpretation allows a nation to
recreate its political form in the light of national
developments to ensure that the political unit (the State)
and the nation remain congruent. Underpinning this
approach is the claim that a nation or people of a given
territory have the right to decide the nature and form of
their own political identity. However in practice the
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exercise of the right has been extremely problematic not
least because it challenges the structure of existing states.
Historically, the notion of the State has been
characterised by the doctrine of territorial sovereignty and
consequently the doctrine has become one of the founding
norms of the international state system. According to
Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Case 2 RIAA (1928) 829,
838:
“Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
other State, the functions of the State.”
Further, traditional notions of statehood persist in
modern international law assisted by Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter, which provides that neither the UN itself nor
states have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of
another state. Thus, statehood remains heavily reliant on
the idea of exclusive territorial competence.
Unsurprisingly states have jealously guarded their
territorial integrity and have been reluctant to accede to
dismemberment at the hands of separatist movements
sustained claims to self-determination. Separatism
therefore has generally been perceived as a domestic
matter beyond the scope of international regulation.
Despite the recognition of the right to self-
determination in numerous international instruments, the
inherent threat posed to the present international system
by secession has meant that the content and application of
this right remains controversial. Clearly the unrestricted
exercise of the right could lead to situations of perpetual
secession where existing states are subject to constant
demands for territorial adjustment in order to realize the
congruence of state and nation. Indeed the possible
creation of thousands of micro-states in this regard would
be extremely disruptive to the structure of the
international system and the viability of states in general.
Although a prima facie right to self-determination is
undoubtedly established in modern international law, the
international community has generally been un-supportive
of the right outside the confines of decolonisation. It is
therefore clear that a tension exists at the heart of the
international system between the legitimate exercise of the
right to self-determination and the maintenance of the
territorial integrity of existing states which underpins the
present international order and provides a degree of peace
and security in international relations. In the
circumstances, it is suggested that uti possidetis provides a
useful lens through which to study the operation of this
fundamental conflict and its wider significance for modern
international law especially in light of the fact that it was
through this doctrine that the physical parameters of many
post-colonial units were determined.
2. Uti possidetis and the process of modern
decolonisation
During the process of African decolonisation it was
thought that the swift withdrawal of colonial powers would
lead to continent-wide anarchy. Thus the dilemma faced at
this juncture was either to allow re-negotiation of the
territorial boundaries of existing colonial entities, or to
simply accept them and pursue development without the
risk of fragmentation. The international community, led by
the UN and the colonial powers themselves decided to give
precedence to the demands of international order over
other legitimating factors such as ethnicity, group affiliation
or cultural identity. This view was accepted at the time by
the Heads of African States and was considered a founding
principle of the Organisation of African Unity (now the
African Union). In Africa therefore it was decided to
choose the departure of the colonial ruler as the ‘critical
date’ after which the physical dimensions of the post-
colonial state would be considered crystallised. This was
achieved by allowing the transition from colonialism to
independence to proceed on the understanding that the
territorial parameters of the old colonial entities would be
transformed into the international boundaries of the new
post-colonial states, an approach justified by reference to
the doctrine of uti possidetis.
In this context it was claimed that the doctrine merely
respected the de facto situation that existed prior to the
departure of the colonial ruler. Thus colonial lines were
invested with the sanctity of permanence with no
alterations permissible except with the consent of the
newly emerging states. For their part, African political
elites largely trained in Western political theory, were
prepared to accept existing colonial boundaries on the
attainment of national independence as an acceptable
manner in which to maintain order but also to quell
separatist threats arrayed against their newly forged states.
This decision found its juridical roots in the doctrine of uti
possidetis and is manifest in Article 3(3) of the OAU Charter
and Resolution 16(1) of the OAU Cairo Declaration (1964).
Since the nature of colonialism had not allowed for the
grooming of non-colonial successors primed for the
smooth transition of power, it was believed that the newly
emerging states were vulnerable to external and internal
interests which might seize power in the aftermath of
independence. Thus in the interests of order, it was
thought the emerging states would need the support of the
international community until they could gain experience
in the art of Statecraft. In this regard, uti possidetis
succeeded in keeping irredentist neighbours at bay while
the fledgling state was allowed to consolidate itself.
Internally, political minorities were restricted to working
within the existing state structure in order to advance their
interests. It was hoped that this would encourage them to
participate in political processes of the post-colonial state
rather than disruptively promoting secession. While this
order was threatened from time to time, most dramatically 21





in Biafra in the 1970s, the overarching support for colonial
boundaries prevented the OAU from assisting such
‘separatism’.
Nonetheless uti possidetis encountered numerous
problems when applied in the African context. In essence
this was due to the nature of the boundaries erected by
colonial rulers which had led to the creation of artificial
entities across the entire continent. Colonial boundaries
were largely drawn in ignorance of historical, geographical
and social factors, often placing antagonistic tribes within
the same colonial entity. In many cases, colonial boundaries
had been drawn merely to restrict the territorial influence
of one colonial power at the expense of another colonial
rival. Accordingly, in relation to decolonisation, a major
flaw of uti possidetis was that it facilitated the creation of
new states without considering the ramifications of this
process for the identity of the peoples affected. The
doctrine ultimately validated the actions of metropolitan
officials who have shaped the identities of numerous
African peoples by determining the territorial parameters
of colonial entities. In 1890 Lord Salisbury accurately
portrayed the nature of colonial acquisition when he said:
“We [the colonial powers] have engaged ... in drawing lines
upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever trod; we have
been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each
other, but we have only been hindered by the small
impediment that we never knew exactly where those
mountains and rivers and lakes were.” (Quoted in J.E.
Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, 1960,
166.)
Clearly the situation presented on decolonisation gave
the African peoples no choice but to exist within territorial
regimes created for them. In an attempt to promote
political cohesion, reference was made to the theory of
state nationalism which asserted that any differences
between the constituent populations contained with the
post-colonial entity could be subsumed at the altar of the
sovereign state by a process of ‘nation-building’. However,
while under the colonial influence, strong unrepresentative
government had prevented group divisions from arising,
with that force gone, latent differences began to re-surface
with serious consequences. Indeed post-colonial peoples
often found themselves living within the boundaries of a
given state with only two things in common. First, that they
had been under the same colonial ruler, and secondly, that
they existed on a territory deemed by that ruler to
constitute the territory of the post-colonial state.
Clearly in asserting uti possidetis the international
community brought a new rigidity to the issue of
international boundaries that affects the very concept of
the ‘national’. The doctrine evidently forecloses questions
of legitimacy; restricting them to a purely territorial basis,
in precedence over other legitimating factors such as
ethnicity, tradition, linguistics, religion, ideology or history.
In addition, by allowing the only exception to rest on the
consent of states, uti possidetis acts on the unsound premise
that the only entities entitled to participate in the process
of boundary re-alignment are states. In this sense it
reinforces the statist view that international personality
only extends to the colonial entity or the post-colonial state
with ‘colonial’ in both cases being restricted to European
domination of non-European populations.
Against this background it is submitted that uti possidetis
presents three main problems. First it critically alters the
right to self-determination in modern international law.
Judge Dillard classically illustrated the thrust of self-
determination in the Western Sahara Case when he said that:
“it is for the people to determine the fate of the territory and
not the territory the fate of the people.” (ICJ Reports, 1975,
12, 116.)
However, by contrast, uti possidetis seeks to settle
different peoples within a fixed territory and treats the
need for territorial order as being more important than the
identity of a people. Thus according to the rationale of uti
possidetis, self-determination can only operate within the
caveat of territorial order.
Secondly, the manner in which uti possidetis ‘stops the
clock’ and freezes the territorial regime on the departure of
the colonial ruler suggests an extremely static view of
history. Thus in the decolonisation process one particular
moment in time is considered ‘critical’ and all the
political processes that follow are subjugated to this
defining moment. While European boundaries have
evolved over the centuries often through the use of force,
boundaries in Africa are deemed settled, based on a
specific reading of history with modern norms against the
use of force, preventing the territorial regime from self-
adjusting. As a result artificial colonial entities developed to
provide ‘order’ were deemed superior to pre-colonial
identities.
Thirdly, it can be argued that with respect to its prime
aim (the preservation of order) uti possidetis is beginning to
falter. While it did provide vital order on the attainment of
independence, a selection of separatist movements,
including the attempted secession of Biafra (Nigeria),
similar action in Katanga (Congo) and the secession of
Eritrea from Ethiopia when combined with the Moroccan
occupation of Western Sahara and the continuing
irredentist claims of Somalia in respect of Ethiopia and
Kenya indicate that the order created by uti possidetis has
been somewhat limited. Further, as we shall see in the next
section, it is arguable that the doctrine has out-lived its
usefulness and perhaps now threatens the very ‘order’ it
sought to preserve in the first place.
From a broader perspective, it is apparent that the
number of conflicts wherein groups seek to enforce their
right to self-determination has been steadily on the
increase. These movements are based on what Thomas
Franck calls ‘post-modern tribalism’ (‘Post-modern22
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Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, C. Brolmann et al,
Peoples and Minorities in International Law, 1993, 3) whereby
such groups seek to break-up existing states in a bid to
constitute uni-ethnic, uni-national states in accordance
with their historical claims. A pertinent example of the rise
of this phenomenon and its implications for the principles
of territoriality can be found in the break up of the former
Yugoslavia.
3. The wider application of uti possidetis
Although problematic in its application to Africa, uti
possidetis came to be perceived as being conducive to the
order cherished by the international community. The next
stage in its development came when international order
was again threatened by separatism in the form of the
unravelling of East European socialist states in the wake of
the Cold War. In the break-up of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and the ‘Velvet Divorce’ between the Slovak and
Czech republics, modern international law took the
opportunity to reinforce the doctrine of uti possidetis. In
particular during the conflict within the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991/1992, the EC Arbitration
(Badinter) Commission was established to monitor
developments within the Yugoslavian Republics. In so
doing it assessed the importance of uti possidetis outside the
colonial context.
In its first Opinion the Commission decided that
Yugoslavia was in the process of breaking up and that the
changing situation must proceed in accordance with the
tenets of modern international law. If deemed applicable to
this situation, uti possidetis would demand that the previous
administrative boundaries of the federal state of Yugoslavia
be maintained and given legitimacy as international
frontiers. In its second Opinion, which concerned self-
determination and the protection of minorities, the
Commission addressed the question of uti possidetis directly
expressing the view that it had been accepted as a general
principle of international law:
“The Commission considers that, whatever the circumstances,
the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis
juris) except where the states concerned agree otherwise.” (92
ILR, 1992, 168.)
This statement arguably indicates that the right to self-
determination is evidently subordinate to the notion of
territorial integrity and the need for international order.
This position appears to be reasonable since the doctrine
seeks to create the preconditions for the maintenance of
order during a time of transition. Nevertheless there were
significant differences between the operation of uti possidetis
in the decolonisation process and its application to the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. State dissolution must
be distinguished from the situations where entities
suppressed by colonialism gained their ‘independence’. In
such cases the colonial power attacked and forcibly
occupied territories without the consent of the constituent
populations. Clearly the application of concepts pertinent
to the achievement of ‘independence’ to a process of state
dissolution is inherently flawed.
In addition, the tone of the second Opinion suggests
that the doctrine of uti possidetis has already been accepted
in state practice and tied to the process of state
recognition. This presents the operation of the doctrine in
Africa as being uncontroversial and suggests that despite
the relatively short period of time that has elapsed since
decolonisation, uti possidetis may have entered into the
annals of customary international law by virtue of those
events. This would represent an extremely simplistic view
with regard to the formation of international custom since
the thresholds of opinio juris and consistent state practice
have not been satisfied in this respect.
In order to fully understand the Commission’s
interpretation of uti possidetis we also need to consider
Opinion No.3, which established the so-called, the
‘Badinter Principles’ namely:
• Respect for external frontiers
• Alteration of frontiers only by consent
• Transfer of former administrative boundaries into
international frontiers via the doctrine of uti possidetis.
This Opinion confirms that in modern international law,
international frontiers must be respected. This view is
strongly supported by international jurisprudence as an
extension of the notion of territorial sovereignty. The only
way in which state sovereignty can be guaranteed is if its
exercise is contained within fixed and recognised
boundaries. Undoubtedly, without such a premise the
current system of sovereign states would be compromised
with weaker states liable to occupation, annexation or
control by stronger states to the detriment of international
order. As a corollary, where alterations are deemed
necessary, they require the express consent of the state
parties involved.
However the real difficulty with the ‘Badinter Principles’
lies in the application of principles, developed in the
context of colonial boundaries to the federal borders of the
former Yugoslavia. To merely sanctify existing
administrative lines as international frontiers is highly
problematic since this suggests that modern international
law protects administrative boundaries as international
frontiers as a matter of right. Thus the fundamental flaw in
this approach must rest on a failure to recognize that the
modern interpretation of uti possidetis was developed in
relation to decolonisation rather than in reference to the
break up of states.
The Commission decided that while uti possidetis was
initially applied in settling decolonisation, it was now
recognized as a general principle of modern international
law. The ostensible justification for the application of uti 23





possidetis to the former Yugoslavia is founded on the ruling
of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute Case, ICJ Reports (1986)
554, 565 which held that:
“… [uti possidetis] is not a special rule which pertains
solely to one specific system of international law. It is a
general principle, which is logically connected with the
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it
occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and
stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal
struggles ...”
However, this case concerned outstanding issues arising
from decolonisation. The two protagonists, Burkina Faso
and Mali, were successor states to French colonial regimes.
It appears that when quoting from the case the
Commission was extremely selective in excluding the
specific reference to decolonisation. In the same sentence,
the judgment goes on to limit the potential scope of uti
possidetis by providing that its purpose is to prevent the
independence and stability of new states being endangered
by fratricidal struggles:
“… provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the
withdrawal of the administering power.”
The situation in Yugoslavia was clearly not one caused by
the withdrawal of an administering power. Accordingly the
difference between the two situations is manifest by the
essential distinction between the process of state
dissolution and secession.
In its first Opinion, the Commission indicated that the
territory of the former Yugoslavia was in the process of
dissolution. It is evident that when a new state emerges
through a process of secession, the Parent State continues
to exist after the separation. However, if new states arise
through a process of state dissolution, the former state
ceases to exist. If what transpired in the former Yugoslavia
amounted to secession then after the series of ‘secessions’
by the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Macedonia, the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia would continue to exist as the Parent State
(albeit territorially reduced) with its international
personality intact. In short, a chain of secessions would
allow the remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro to
constitute the (Parent) state of Yugoslavia. However, it is
submitted that the preferable view is that the secessions of
Slovenia and Croatia initiated a process of dissolution
which signalled the end of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, thus leaving Serbia/Montenegro (which later
renamed themselves the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’)
as an unrecognised political entity. The Commission
through Opinions 8–11 clearly favoured the latter view and
the international community was supportive of this
interpretation by requiring that the ‘FRY’ along with other
former republics meet the criteria established by the EC
and USA for the recognition of new states arising out of the
former Yugoslavia (see the EC Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union and the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia 62
BYIL 1991, 559). In addition, it refused to allow the ‘FRY’
to automatically succeed to the Yugoslavia seat at the UN
(Security Council Resolution 757, 1992).
The process of decolonisation may be classified as a
dispute over territory since the boundaries set by the
colonisers were not open to re-negotiation by the
constituent peoples of the post-colonial states. However by
contrast, the dissolution of Yugoslavia arguably presented a
dispute over the implications of a particular identity for a
given territory. Thus the claims of self-determination made
by the Serbian enclaves in Croatia and Bosnia indicate that
the question posed on dissolution was whether the
possession of a minority identity was sufficient justification
for the merger of a given territory with another in which
the group would constitute a majority. The ostensible
reason for this process arose from the fear that measures
intended to protect minorities would be inadequate in the
light of conditions on the ground. Consequently it was
argued that the entire region of the former Yugoslavia
should be reconstituted into uni-ethnic states in an
attempt to avoid further ethnic conflict an attitude
reflected in the Dayton Agreement.
Clearly in the former Yugoslavia the international
community was unwilling to endorse the trend towards
post-modern tribalism. However it is equally apparent that
the undoubted existence of the prima facie right to self-
determination has ensured that states cannot simply
reinforce existing territorial regimes in the face of ethnic
conflict as a matter of course. With states gravely
concerned about the possibility of intra-state conflicts
justified by reference to self-determination, it is imperative
that modern international law reassess the relationship
between the right to self-determination and its attendant
doctrine of uti possidetis in order to develop a more
equitable approach to the resolution of such territorial
disputes.
In this context, if the Badinter Principles were accepted
as representing a faithful interpretation of modern
international law, federal states would be particularly
vulnerable since the territorial dimensions would already
exist by which secession or dissolution could proceed at
the hands of separatist groups. Consequently, this
development would not serve the interests of the federal
state since by encouraging the participation of minority
groups within its political structures it could be setting in
place the very basis for its own demise. Thus if
administrative lines are perceived as potential international
boundaries the protection of minority rights could be
seriously compromised as a result.
While the notion of territorial integrity represents a
founding theme of the international state system, it is clear
that its provisions apply strictly to states and not to the
territorial integrity of sub-state units even if the state in
issue is structured along federal lines. In addition, it is a24
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function of territorial sovereignty that states are allowed to
modify their existing administrative boundaries. This does
not affect international principles concerning the sanctity
of boundaries and indeed, if uti possidetis was made
applicable in such situations it would politicise the drawing
of administrative boundaries and present a major incursion
into the exclusive jurisdiction of states.
If a federal state can legitimately break up into republics
with the same borders they had when components of the
federal state, why are autonomous regions located within
federal and unitary states not given similar rights (e.g.
Kosovo)? It is suggested that rather than ensuring the order
so cherished by the international community, uti possidetis
actually sows the seeds of a greater disorder in the longer
term. This is supported by the fact that the enforcement of
rigid borders in a situation such as the former Yugoslavia
could only result in more forced expulsions with peoples
being required to realign themselves in the wake of new
boundaries that have suddenly taken on greater significance
than originally envisaged. The resultant transfers can be
extremely harmful as evidenced by the transfer of Muslims
and Hindus from India and Pakistan to each other
respectively at the dawn of independence for British India
in 1947. These instance highlights the consequential
dangers posed by the re-definition of a multinational entity
to reflect newly created territorial regimes. This presents a
classic reversal of the interpretation given to self-
determination by Judge Dillard in the Western Sahara Case
when he said it is for the people to determine the fate of
the territory and not the territory the fate of the people.
CONCLUSION
The Opinions of the Badinter Commission should not
be seen as providing an accurate interpretation of the
treatment of territory in modern international law. In
particular, there is a fundamental difference between the
withdrawal of an administering colonial power and
instances of state dissolution as witnessed in the former
Yugoslavia. It follows that the Commission’s attempt to
extend uti possidetis to non-colonial situations is of dubious
validity and therefore liable to challenge. In such cases,
blind adherence to uti possidetis is clearly problematic as in
its current form the doctrine reduces complex questions
national identity to a simple process of line drawing in the
perceived interest of order. In so doing this approach fails
to realize the potential harm that could result in the
maintenance of an unjust and unstable order. This
argument was first advanced in relation to international
boundaries created on decolonisation, however the
weaknesses inherent within the doctrine are even more
glaring when transposed into the general canon of modern
international law.
Evidently an unbridled right to self-determination
causes great anxiety for states and threatens the existing
international system. Nonetheless, adherence to a rigid set
of territorial principles as exemplified by uti possidetis fails
to address legitimate claims of self-determination and
serves to fuel separatist activity in the longer term. It
follows therefore that an international state system, which
is not prepared to accommodate such valid claims sacrifices
group identity and national development which provide the
very conditions for enduring stability in favour of a
momentary and fragile peace.
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